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Abstract
The article introduces a ceteris paribus modal logic, called CP, interpreted on the
equivalence classes induced by finite sets of propositional atoms. This logic is studied
and then used to embed three logics of strategic interaction, namely atemporal STIT, the
coalition logic of propositional control (CL−PC) and the starless fragment of the dynamic
logic of propositional assignments (DL−PA). The embeddings highlight a common ceteris
paribus structure underpinning the key operators of all these apparently very different logics
and show, we argue, remarkable similarities behind some of the most influential formalisms
for reasoning about strategic interaction.
1. Introduction
The logical analysis of agency and games—for an expository introduction to the field see van
der Hoek and Pauly’s overview paper (2007)—has boomed in the last two decades giving
rise to a plethora of different logics in particular within the multi-agent systems field.1 At
the heart of these logics are always representations of the possible choices (or actions) of
groups of players (or agents) and their powers to force specific outcomes of the game. Some
logics take the former as primitives, like STIT (the logic of seeing to it that, Belnap, Perloff,
& Xu, 2001; Horty, 2001), some take the latter like CL (coalition logic, Pauly, 2002; Goranko,
Jamroga, & Turrini, 2013) and ATL (alternating-time temporal logic, Alur, Henzinger, &
Kupferman, 2002).
In these formalisms the power of players is modeled in terms of the notion of effectivity.
In a strategic game, the α-effectivity of a group of players consists of those sets of outcomes
of the game for which the players have some collective action which forces the outcome of
the game to end up in that set, no matter what the other players do (Moulin & Peleg,
1982). So, if a set of outcomes X belongs to the α-effectivity of a set of players J , there
exists an individual action for each agent in J such that, for all actions of the other players,
the outcome of the game will be contained in X. If we keep the actions of the other agents
1. The richness of this logical landscape was the object of the IJCAI’13 invited talk by A. Herzig Logics
for Multi-Agent Systems: a Critical Overview.
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fixed, then the selection of an individual action for each agent in J corresponds to a choice
of J under the assumption that the other agents stick to their choices.
It was already observed by van Benthem, Girard, and Roy (2009) that this formalization
of choice and power in games is of an ‘all other things being equal’, or ceteris paribus, nature.
Considering which outcomes of a game are possible for a set of players J once the other
players have fixed their actions, amounts to considering what may be the case under the
ceteris paribus condition ‘all actions of the agents not in J being equal (to their current
ones)’. In the aforementioned work van Benthem et al. also show how this intuition can
be used, for instance, to give a modal formulation of Nash equilibria of one-shot games.2
In the current paper we leverage this intuition further and show how it can provide a novel
systematization of many of the most influential formalisms in the field of logic and games.
1.1 Scientific Context
Formal relationships linking the logics (or fragments thereof) we mentioned above have
been object of several publications. Notable examples are: the embedding of CL into the
next-time fragment of ATL (Goranko, 2001) and the embedding of CL into NCL (normal
coalition logic, Broersen, Herzig, & Troquard, 2007; Balbiani, Gasquet, Herzig, Schwarzen-
truber, & Troquard, 2008a), the embedding of CL and ATL into STIT (Broersen, Herzig,
& Troquard, 2005, 2006). Earlier contributions have also attempted more comprehensive
systematizations of the field of logic and games. Two in particular are worth mentioning:
Goranko and Jamroga’s work (2004), which compares game logics based on the computa-
tion tree abstraction like ATL and its variants; and Herzig’s work (2014), which provides
a conceptual and syntax-based—while we favor here semantic methods—comparison of all
the main formalisms in the literature.
1.2 Aim of the Paper
The aim of the paper is to provide a technical contribution towards a unification of the field
of logic and games. We set out to develop a series of embeddings which highlight a common
structure in the representation of choice and power, which underpins the semantics of all
the logics mentioned above.
We focus on the components of the semantics of those logics that have directly to do
with the representation of choice and power, and we abstract away from the representation
of time and repeated interaction. So the logics we will be working with are: the atemporal
fragment of STIT, logic CL−PC (coalition logic of propositional control, van der Hoek &
Wooldridge, 2005) and the starless fragment of DL−PA (dynamic logic of propositional
assignments, van Eijck, 2000; Balbiani, Herzig, & Troquard, 2013). These logics cover,
arguably, a large spectrum of the most influential existing formalisms.3 Logic STIT is often
considered a standard in the literature, as it embeds both CL and ATL (Broersen et al., 2005,
2. We refer the reader to Osborne and Rubinstein’s textbook (1994) for an introduction to the basic notions
of game theory.
3. It is worth stressing that we focus here on logics of choice and power (that is, on the notion of effec-
tivity) and not on formalisms incorporating also an explicit representation of how choice and power are
implemented (that is, an explicit notion of strategy), such as for instance ATL with explicit strategies
(Walther, van der Hoek, & Wooldridge, 2007).
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Figure 1: Summary of the embeddings established in the paper and known from the literature
An arrow indicates that each formula of the source logic is satisfiable if and only
if a suitable translation of that formula is satisfiable in the target logic. DL−PA
denotes the starless version of dynamic logic of propositional assignments, NCL
and STIT denote the atemporal version of, respectively, normal coalition logic
and the seeing-to-it logic. S5 denotes the normal modal logic of equivalence rela-
tions. Dotted lines indicate embeddings known in the literature: from CL−PC to
DL−PA (Balbiani et al., 2013) and from STIT to NCL (and vice versa) with re-
spect to fragments of the respective languages (Lorini & Schwarzentruber, 2011).
The embedding from STIT to CP assumes a bound on the STIT-models. All
embeddings are polynomial except for the one from CP to S5.
2006), so we use it as a natural starting point. Logic CL−PC is an influential extension of
CL and has strong formal ties (Dunne, van der Hoek, Kraus, & Wooldridge, 2008) with the,
equally influential, Boolean games model (Harrenstein, van der Hoek, Meyer, & Witteveen,
2001) in multi-agent systems. Finally, logic DL−PA is an extension of PDL (propositional
dynamic logic, Harel, Kozen, & Tiuryn, 2000), which has recently been proposed as a new
standard for the representation of choice and power (Herzig, Lorini, Moisan, & Troquard,
2011; Balbiani et al., 2013).
To articulate our analysis, whose main technical tool consists of satisfiability-preserving
embeddings, the paper introduces and studies—in its axiomatization and complexity—a
simple ceteris paribus logic based on propositional equivalence, which we call CP. Such
logic is the yardstick allowing us to compare and unify STIT, CL−PC and DL−PA.
1.3 Outline and Summary of Results
Section 2 introduces logic CP. The logic will be compared to S5 and axiomatized.
Section 3 provides a study of the relationship between the atemporal version of STIT and
CP. We show that CP embeds atemporal group STIT—the fragment of atemporal STIT
in which actions of both individuals and groups are represented—under the assumption
that the agents’ choices are bounded. We call the latter atemporal ‘bounded’ group STIT.
Moreover, we show that CP embeds atemporal individual STIT—the variant of atemporal
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STIT in which only the actions of individuals are represented. The former embedding is
used to transfer complexity results to CP. We also present an embedding in CP of a variant
of atemporal group STIT in which groups are nested (i.e., given two sets of agents J and J ′
either J ⊆ J ′ or viceversa).
Section 4 provides an embedding of the coalition logic of propositional control into atemporal
‘bounded’ group STIT—and therefore, indirectly, into CP—as well as a direct embedding
of CL−PC into CP.
Section 5 provides an embedding of the starless fragment of DL−PA into CP as well as an
embedding of CP into DL−PA and therefore, indirectly, of STIT (on bounded models) and
CL−PC into DL−PA.
Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the obtained results, put them in perspective with related
work and draw some general implications for the field. We conclude in Section 7. Longer
proofs are collected in a technical appendix at the end of the paper.
Figure 1 gives a graphical presentation of the embeddings established in the paper—
as well as relevant ones already known in the literature. Two embeddings are known for
the above logics: the embedding of CL−PC into DL−PA (Balbiani et al., 2013), and the
embedding of STIT into NCL, and vice versa, when the language of STIT (and of NCL) are
restricted to a fragment which does not allow nesting modalities.4
2. A Ceteris Paribus Logic Based on Propositional Equivalence
In this section we introduce and study the logic that will be used as target logic in all the
embeddings we will present. The section starts with the definition of equivalence modulo
a set of atoms. Then we present our ceteric paribus logic CP whose semantics is based on
these equivalence relations. The section finishes with an exponentially embedding of ceteris
paribus logic CP into S5 proving that the CP-satisfiability problem is decidable.
2.1 Equivalence Modulo a Set of Atoms
Consider a structure (W,V ) where W is a set of states, and V : P −→ 2W a valuation
function from a countable set of atomic propositions P to subsets of W .5
Definition 1. (Equivalence modulo X) Given a pair (W,V ), X ⊆ P and |X| < ω, the
relation ∼VX⊆W 2 is defined as:
w ∼VX w′ ⇐⇒ ∀p ∈ X :
(
w ∈ V (p)⇐⇒ w′ ∈ V (p))
When X is a singleton (e.g. p), we will often write ∼Vp instead of ∼V{p}. Also, in order to
avoid clutter, we will often drop the reference to V in ∼VX when clear from the context.
Intuitively, two states w and w′ are equivalent up to set X, or X-equivalent, if and only
if they satisfy the same atoms in X (according to a given valuation V ). The finiteness of
4. The reader is referred to Lorini and Schwarzentruber’s paper (2011) for the BNF of this language.
5. In the literature game logics are sometimes defined over a countable set of atoms (e.g., Balbiani et al.,
2013) and sometimes over a finite set of atoms (e.g., van der Hoek & Wooldridge, 2005). Here we opt for
generality and define the language of CP over a countable set. Under the assumption of a finite supply
of atoms some of the results we present later would trivialize (for instance the CP satisfiability problem
would be in PTIME) and would therefore hide some of the interesting technical features of CP.
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X is clearly not essential in the definition. It is assumed because, as we will see, each set
X will be taken to model a set of actions of some agent in a game form and sets of actions
are always assumed to be finite.
We state the following simple fact without proof. It highlights some interesting features
of the notion of propositional equivalence modulo subsets of P, some of which will be of use
later on in the paper.
Fact 1. (Properties of ∼P ) The following holds for any set of states W , valuation V :
P −→ 2W and finite sets X,Y ⊆ P:
(i) ∼X is reflexive, transitive and symmetric;
(ii) if X ⊆ Y then ∼Y ⊆ ∼X ;
(iii) if X is a singleton, ∼X induces a partition of W with at most 2 cells;
(iv) ∼X ∩ ∼Y = ∼X∪Y ;
(v) ∼∅ = W 2.
Intuitively: (i) states that each ∼X is an equivalence relation; (ii) states that the larger
the set of atoms, the more refined is the equivalence relation indexed by it; (iii) states that
if the set of atom is a singleton, then its equivalence relation would induce a partition of
one (if the proposition in the singleton is globally true or globally false in the model) or two
cells (otherwise); (iv) states that the relation indexed by the union of two sets of atoms is
the relation one obtains by intersecting the relations of the two sets; finally (v) states that
the relation of the empty set of atoms is the global relation.
2.2 A Modal Logic of the ∼X Relation
In this section we consider a simple modal language interpreted on relations ∼X and ax-
iomatize its logic on the class of structures (W,V ). The key modal operator of the language
will be 〈X〉, whose intuitive meaning is ‘ϕ is the case in some state which is X-equivalent to
the current one’ or, to stress a ceteris paribus reading, ‘ϕ is possible all things expressed in
X being equal’. We call the resulting logic propositional ceteris paribus logic, CP in short.
2.2.1 Syntax of CP.
Let P be a countable set of atomic propositions. The language LCP(P) is defined by the
following BNF:
LCP(P) : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | 〈X〉ϕ
where p ranges over P and X is a finite subset of atomic propositions (X ⊆ P and X finite).
Note that as the set of finite subsets of atomic propositions is countable, the language
LCP(P) is also countable. The Boolean connectives >,∨,→,↔ and the dual operators [X]
are defined as usual. Although we have taken diamond operators as primitive, we will for
convenience also make use of box operators to state some results in later sections.
The set SF (ϕ) of subformulas of a formula ϕ is defined inductively as follows:
• SF (p) = {p};
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• SF (¬ϕ) = {¬ϕ} ∪ SF (ϕ);
• SF (ϕ ∧ ψ) = {ϕ ∧ ψ} ∪ SF (ϕ) ∪ SF (ψ);
• SF (〈X〉ϕ) = {〈X〉ϕ} ∪ SF (ϕ).
We say that a signature X appears in ϕ if there exists a formula ψ such that 〈X〉ψ ∈ SF (ϕ).
2.2.2 Semantics of CP
This is the class of models we will be working with:
Definition 2. (CP-models) Given a countable set P, a CP-model for LCP(P) is a tuple
M = (W,V ) where:
• W is a non-empty set of states;
• V : P −→ 2W is a valuation function.
A CP-model is called universal if W = 2P and V is s.t. V (p) = {w | p ∈ w}. It is called
non-redundant if ∼P is the identity relation in W 2.
Intuitively, a CP-model consists just of a state-space and a valuation function for a given
set of atoms. The satisfaction relation is defined as follows:
Definition 3. (Satisfaction for CP-models) Let M = (W,V ) be an CP-model for LCP(P),
w ∈W and ϕ,ψ ∈ LCP(P):
M, w |=CP p ⇐⇒ w ∈ V (p);
M, w |=CP ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, w 6|=CP ϕ;
M, w |=CP ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, w |=CP ϕ andM, w |= ψ;
M, w |=CP 〈X〉ϕ ⇐⇒ ∃w′ ∈W : w ∼VX w′ andM, w′ |=CP ϕ
Formula ϕ is CP-satisfiable, if and only if there exists a model M and a state w such that
M, w |=CP ϕ. Formula ϕ is valid in M, noted M |=CP ϕ, if and only if for all w ∈ W ,
M, w |=CP ϕ. Finally, ϕ is CP-valid, noted |=CP ϕ, if and only if it is valid in all CP-models.
The logical consequence of formula ϕ from a set of formulae, noted Φ |=CP ϕ, is defined as
usual.
So, modal operators are interpreted on the equivalence relations ∼X induced by the
valuation of the model. It is worth observing that the logic of this class of models is not
closed under uniform substitution,6 that is, logic CP is not uniform.7 To witness that, notice
that formula [{p}]p ∨ [{p}]¬p is valid, whereas [{p}]ϕ ∨ [{p}]¬ϕ is not.
Let us give a simple illustration of the above semantics.
Example 1. Let us consider the following model M made up of 5 states w, x, u, y, z:
6. For the definition of uniform substitution the reader is referred to the textbook by Blackburn, de Rijke,
and Venema (2001, Def. 1.18).
7. The terminology comes from Goldblatt’s work (1992).
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w : p, q x : p u : p, q, r z : q y
For instance, we have M, w |=CP 〈{p, q}〉r and M, z |=CP [{p}]¬r.
The following lemmas state simple facts concerning the relation of logic CP with logic
S5 and isolate an interesting class of CP-models.
Lemma 1. Let L∅CP(P) the set of formulae ϕ ∈ LCP(P) containing only 〈∅〉 operators. The
set of formulae of L∅CP(P) which are CP-valid is the modal logic of Kripke frames (W,W 2),
i.e., logic S5.
Proof. It follows directly from Fact 1 item (v).
In other words, the 〈∅〉 operator of LCP is nothing but the global modality (Blackburn
et al., 2001, pp. 367–370). The next lemma states that CP is actually the logic of the class
of relevant CP-models.
Lemma 2. Every satisfiable CP-formula is satisfiable on a non-redundant model.
Proof. Assume M, w |= ϕ. We show that MP, |w|P |= ϕ of M where MP is the quotient
of M by the equivalence relation ∼P (defined in the natural way) and |w|P is the set
of states which are ∼P-equivalent to w. We proceed by induction on the structure of ϕ.
The propositional and Boolean cases are obvious. Let ϕ = 〈X〉ψ with X ⊆ P. From the
assumption and the semantics of CP operators we have that there exists v such that w ∼X v
andM, v |= ψ. By construction we directly have that |w|P ∼X |v|P. By IHMP, |v|P |= ψ,
and therefore MP, |w|P |= 〈X〉ψ.
2.2.3 Axiomatics of CP
We can obtain an axiom system for CP by a standard reduction technique exploiting Lemma
1. The axiom system is given in Figure 2. The first thing to notice is that the system consists
of the usual S5 axioms plus the Reduce axiom. Logic S5 is known to be sound and strongly
complete for the class of models where the accessibility relation is the total relation W 2
(Blackburn et al., 2001), and modality 〈∅〉 can therefore be axiomatized as the (dual of)
the global modality.
Having said this, soundness and strong completeness of the above system are easy to
establish.
Theorem 1. The axiom system given in Figure 2 is sound and strongly complete for the
class of CP-models.
Proof. Soundness It suffices to show that Reduce is CP-valid, which follows straightfor-
wardly from Definition 1. Completeness To obtain completeness we proceed as customary
in DEL (van Ditmarsch, Kooi, & van der Hoek, 2007; Wang & Cao, 2013). We first fix a
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(P) all tautologies of propositional calculus
(K) [∅](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([∅]ϕ→ [∅]ψ)
(T) ϕ→ 〈∅〉ϕ
(4) 〈∅〉〈∅〉ϕ→ 〈∅〉ϕ
(5) 〈∅〉ϕ→ [∅]〈∅〉ϕ
(Reduce) [X]ϕ↔
∧
Y⊆X
∧
p∈Y
p ∧
∧
p∈X\Y
¬p
→ [∅]
∧
p∈Y
p ∧
∧
p∈X\Y
¬p
→ ϕ

(MP) if `CP ϕ and `CP ϕ→ ψ then `CP ψ
(N) if `CP ϕ then `CP [∅]ϕ
Figure 2: Axiom schemas and rules of CP. X,Y range over finite elements of 2P, ϕ,ψ
over LCP(P), and p over P. As usual, `CP means that there exists a sequence of
formulae each of which are either an axiom or are obtained from previous formulae
through the application of an inference rule.
translation tr0 : LCP(P) −→ L∅CP(P) as follows:
tr0(p) = p
tr0(¬ϕ) = ¬tr0(ϕ)
tr0(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr0(ϕ) ∧ tr0(ψ)
tr0([X]ϕ) =
∧
Y⊆X
∧
p∈Y
p ∧
∧
p∈X\Y
¬p
→ [∅]
∧
p∈Y
p ∧
∧
p∈X\Y
¬p
→ tr0(ϕ)

We also write tr0(Φ) for {tr0(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ Φ}. Notice that the translation removes occurrences
of 〈X〉 and [X] operators from formulae where X 6= ∅ and it has the same structure of axiom
Reduce. Consider then the following rule of substitution of provable equivalents (REP):
(REP) if `CP ϕ↔ ϕ′ then `CP ψ ↔ ψ[ϕ/ϕ′]
where ψ[ϕ/ϕ′] is the formula that results from ψ by replacing zero or more occurrences of
ϕ, in ψ, by ϕ′. We have that rule REP is derivable in the axiom system of Figure 2 (†). The
proof of this claim is provided in Appendix A. By using axiom Reduce and rule REP we
obtain by (†) that, for any ϕ ∈ LCP(P), `CP ϕ↔ tr0(ϕ) (‡). We can then proceed as follows:
if Φ |=CP ϕ then tr0(Φ) |=CP tr0(ϕ) by (‡); by Lemma 1 and the strong completeness of
S5 we thus obtain tr0(Φ) `S5 tr0(ϕ) and therefore tr0(Φ) `CP tr0(ϕ); finally by (‡) again it
follows that Φ `CP ϕ, which proves strong completeness.
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The crux of the above reduction argument lies in the use of axiom Reduce. What the
axiom does is to enable the reduction of [X]-formulae by taking care of all the possible truth-
value combinations of the atoms in X. If a given combination, e.g.,
(∧
p∈Y p ∧
∧
p∈X\Y ¬p
)
,
is true at a given state (for some Y ), then in all accessible states, if that combination is
true, then what occurs in the scope of [X] is also true.
We opted for the above axiomatization in virtue of its simplicity, but alternative systems
are of course possible. One in particular is worth mentioning. It first reduces 〈p〉 operators
by axiom:
〈p〉ϕ↔ ((p ∧ 〈∅〉(p ∧ ϕ)) ∨ (¬p ∧ 〈∅〉(¬p ∧ ϕ))) (1)
This states that 〈p〉ϕ is equivalent to either the case in which the current state satisfies p
and there exists a (possibly different) p-state where ϕ is true, or the case where ¬p is true
and there exists a (possibly different) ¬p-state where ϕ is true (recall property (iii) in Fact
1). Given the above reduction, one can then use axioms to enforce the appropriate behavior
of ∼X relations where X consists of more than one atom. To this aim, axioms can be used
that are known to be canonical for properties (ii) and (iv) of Fact 1, namely:
〈X ∪ Y 〉ϕ→ 〈X〉ϕ (2)
〈X〉i ∧ 〈Y 〉i→ 〈X ∪ Y 〉i (3)
where i ranges over a set of nominals. A complete system could then be obtained by
axiomatizing the behavior of nominals—through axioms and rules used in hybrid logic
(Areces & Ten Cate, 2006). From that system, a named canonical model could be built
(i.e., a canonical model where all maximal consistent sets contain exactly one nominal)
where the axioms in Formulae 1-3 would enforce the desirable properties on the canonical
relations.
2.3 Exponentially Embedding CP into S5
The property expressed by axiom Reduce enables a truth-preserving translation of CP into
S5 via the translation tr0 provided in the proof of Theorem 1. This translation is, however,
such that the length of the translated formula grows exponentially by a tower of exponents
of height equal to the modal depth of the original formula.
In this section we propose a translation that is single exponential and preserves satisfi-
ability. Take the standard modal language L(P) with one modal operator  defined on
the set of atoms P. S5-models are structures M = (W,V ) where W is a set of states, and
V : P −→ 2W a valuation function. Given an S5-model M = (W,V ) and a state w ∈ W ,
the truth conditions are defined as follows:
M, w |=S5 ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀u ∈W :M, u |=S5 ϕ
S5-satisfiability is defined as usual. It is possible to define an exponential truth-preserving
reduction tr : LCP(P) −→ L(P) as follows:
tr(ϕ0) = pϕ0 ∧
∧
ϕ∈SF (ϕ0)
(pϕ ↔ tr1(ϕ))
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where pϕ are fresh atomic proposition (note that pϕ0 is pϕ when ϕ is the formula ϕ0 itself,
which is also a subformula of ϕ0)
8, ϕ ranging over SF (ϕ0) and tr1 is defined as follows:
tr1(p) = p for p ∈ P
tr1(¬ϕ) = ¬tr1(ϕ)
tr1(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr1(ϕ) ∧ tr1(ψ)
tr1([∅]ϕ) = pϕ
tr1([X]ϕ) =
∧
Y⊆X
∧
p∈Y
p ∧
∧
p∈X\Y
¬p
→ 
∧
p∈Y
p ∧
∧
p∈X\Y
¬p
→ pϕ

Intuitively, the translation is designed to operate like axiom Reduce but avoiding expo-
nential blow-up to pile up with the modal depth of the formula. The atomic propositions
pϕ in tr1([X]ϕ) avoid the non-elementary size of tr(ϕ0). The definition of tr1([∅]ϕ) corre-
sponds to the degenerated case of tr1([X]ϕ) where X = ∅.The following theorem states the
satisfiability preservation. The proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. (tr preserves satisfiability) Let ϕ0 be a CP-formula. The two following state-
ments are equivalent: ϕ0 is CP-satisfiable; tr(ϕ0) is S5-satisfiable.
As a consequence, we also obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. (Decidability) The satisfiability problem for CP is decidable and in NEXP-
TIME.
Proof. The satisfiability problem for S5 is decidable and in NP (Blackburn et al., 2001, Ch.
6). The result follows from Theorem 2 and a decision procedure may work as follows: in
order to check that ϕ is satisfiable we compute the formula tr(ϕ) and we apply a NP-decision
procedure to check whether tr(ϕ) is S5-satisfiable or not.
Notice that if the cardinality of each X that appears in operators [X] of ϕ is bounded
by a fixed integer, then the translation tr becomes polynomial in the size of ϕ. Thus,
as S5-satisfiability problem is NP-complete, the CP-satisfiability problem with a bounded
cardinality restrictions over set of atomic propositions in modal operators is in NP. As it is
trivially NP-hard, it is NP-complete.
In Section 3, we will embed the atemporal version of STIT (the logic of seeing to it that)
into CP thereby obtaining lower bounds results.
3. The Ceteris Paribus Structure of STIT Logic
In this section, we investigate the possibility of embedding the logic of agency STIT into
CP. STIT logic (the logic of seeing to it that, Belnap et al., 2001; Horty, 2001) is one of
the most prominent logical accounts of agency. It is the logic of constructions of the form
“agent i (or group J) sees to it that ϕ”. STIT has a non-standard modal semantics based on
the concepts of moment and history. However, as shown by Balbiani, Herzig, and Troquard
(2008b) and Herzig and Schwarzentruber (2008), the basic STIT language without temporal
operators can be ‘simulated’ in a standard Kripke semantics.
8. Such a use of fresh atomic propositions to obtain more efficient satisfiability preserving translations is
based on the propositional logic technique known as Tseitin transformation (Tseitin, 1968).
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3.1 Atemporal Group STIT
First let us recall the syntax and the semantics of atemporal group STIT. The language of
this logic is built from a countable set of atomic propositions P and a finite set of agents
AGT = {1, . . . , n} and is defined by the following BNF:
LG−STIT(P, AGT ) : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | [J : stit]ϕ
where p ranges over P and J ranges over 2AGT . The construction [J : stit]ϕ is read “group
J sees to it that ϕ is true regardless of what the other agents choose”. We define the dual
operator 〈J : stit〉ϕ def= ¬[J : stit]¬ϕ. When J = ∅, the construction [∅ : stit]ϕ is read “ϕ
is true regardless of what every agent chooses” or simply “ϕ is necessarily true”.
Definition 4 (STIT-Kripke model, Herzig & Schwarzentruber, 2008). A STIT-Kripke model
M = (W, {RJ}J⊆AGT , V ) is a 3-tuple where:
• W is a non-empty set of worlds;
• for all J ⊆ AGT , RJ is an equivalence relation such that:
i) RJ ⊆ R∅;
ii) RJ =
⋂
j∈J R{j};
iii) for all w ∈ W and (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Wn, if u1 ∈ R{1}(w), . . . , un ∈ R{n}(w) then⋂
1≤j≤nR{j}(uj) 6= ∅;
• V : P→ 2W is a valuation function for atomic propositions;
with RJ(w) = {u ∈W : (w, u) ∈ RJ} for any J ∈ 2AGT .
The partition induced by the equivalence relation RJ is the set of possible choices of
the group J .9 Indeed, in STIT a choice of a group J at a given world w is identified with
the set of possible worlds RJ(w). We call RJ(w) the set of possible outcomes of group
J ’s choice at world w, in the sense that group J ’s current choice at w forces the possible
worlds to be in RJ(w). The set R∅(w) is simply the set of possible outcomes at w, or said
differently, the set of outcomes of the current game at w. According to Condition (i), the
set of possible outcomes of a group J ’s choice is a subset of the set of possible outcomes.
Condition (ii), called additivity, means that the choices of the agents in a group J is made
up of the choices of each individual agent and no more. Condition (iii) corresponds to the
property of independence of agents: whatever each agent decides to do, the set of outcomes
corresponding to the joint action of all agents is non-empty. More intuitively, this means
that agents can never be deprived of choices due to the choices made by other agents. In
Lorini and Schwarzentruber’s work (2011) determinism for the group AGT was assumed.
That is to say that the set of outcomes corresponding to a joint action of all agents is a
singleton. Horty’s group STIT logic (Horty, 2001) does not suppose this. Here we deal with
Horty’s version of STIT. So a STIT model is a game form in which a joint action of all
agents might determine more than one outcome.
9. One can also see the partition induced by the equivalence relation Rj as the set of actions that agent j
can try, where the notion of trying corresponds to the notion of volition studied in philosophy of action
(e.g., O’Shaughnessy, 1974; McCann, 1974).
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Figure 3: The STIT-model M
Example 2. The tuple M = (W,R∅, R{1}, R{2}, R{1,2}, V ) defined by:
• W = {w, u, v, r, s, t, z};
• R∅ = W ×W ;
• R{1} = {w, u, v}2 ∪ {r, s}2 ∪ {t, z}2;
• R{2} = {w, r, t}2 ∪ {u, v, s, z}2;
• R{1,2} = {(w,w), (r, r), (s, s), (t, t), (z, z), (u, u), (v, v), (u, v), (v, u)};
• for all p ∈ P, V (p) = ∅.
is a STIT-Kripke model. Figure 3 shows the model M. The equivalence classes induced by
the equivalence relation R{1} are represented by ellipses and correspond to the choices of
agent 1. The equivalence classes induced by the equivalence relation R{2} are represented
by rectangles and correspond to the choices of agent 2. The choice of group {1, 2} at a
given world is determined by the intersection of the choice of agent 1 and the choice of
agent 2 at this world. For example, the choice of agent 1 at world u is {w, u, v} whereas
the choice of agent 2 at world u is {u, v, s, z}. The choice of group {1, 2} at u is {u, v}.
Note that Condition (iii) of Definition 4 ensures that for any choice of agent 1 and for any
choice of agent 2 the intersection between these two choices is non-empty. That is, for any
equivalence class induced by the relation R{1} and for any equivalence class induced by the
relation R{2}, the intersection between these two equivalence classes is non-empty.
Given a STIT-Kripke model M = (W, {RJ}J⊆AGT , V ) and a world w in M, the truth
conditions of STIT formulae are the following:
M, w |=STIT p ⇐⇒ w ∈ V (p);
M, w |=STIT ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, w 6|=STIT ϕ;
M, w |=STIT ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, w |=STIT ϕ andM, w |=STIT ψ;
M, w |=STIT [J : stit]ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ RJ(w) :M, v |=STIT ϕ
where RJ(w) = {u ∈W | (w, u) ∈ RJ}.
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3.2 Embedding Atemporal STIT into CP
We are not able to embed group STIT into CP because of many reasons. The first one is
that the group STIT satisfiability problem is undecidable if there are more than 3 agents
(Herzig & Schwarzentruber, 2008).10 The second one is that group STIT does not have
the finite model property. Indeed Herzig and Schwarzentruber (2008) provide a translation
from the product logic S5n to group STIT logic, and as S5n does not have the finite model
property (Gabbay, Kurucz, Wolter, & Zakharyaschev, 2003), so atemporal group STIT will
not have it. On the contrary CP inherits the finite model property from S5. Indeed, if a
formula ϕ is CP-satisfiable, Theorem 2 says that tr(ϕ) is S5-satisfiable. But as S5 has the
polynomial model property, there exists a polynomial-sized S5-model for tr(ϕ) in the size
of tr(ϕ). In other words, there exists an exponential S5-model for tr(ϕ) in the size of ϕ.
Theorem 2 ensures that there exists an exponential CP-model for ϕ in the size of ϕ.
We will nevertheless embed a variant of group STIT under the assumption that every
agent has a finite and bounded number of actions in his repertoire. For every agent j, a
Rj-equivalence class Rj(u) corresponds to an action of agent j. We say that agent j has kj
actions in a STIT model if and only if there are exactly kj Rj-equivalence classes in M.
The game structure in STIT-models should be enforced in CP-models. That is why
we introduce special atomic propositions to encode the game structure. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the set P contains special atomic propositions repj1, rep
j
2, . . . for
all agents j which are used to represent the actions of the agents. Let k be the maximal
number of actions: k = maxj∈AGTkj . For every agent, we represent its actions by numbers
` in {0, . . . , k − 1} and some atomic propositions encode the binary representation of `.
Let m be an integer that represents the number of digits we need to represent an action.
For instance let m = dlog2ke (the ceiling of the logarithm of k). For a given agent j,
Rjm = {repj1, . . . , repjm} is the set atomic propositions that represent the binary digits of an
action of agent j. We suppose that if j 6= i then Rjm ∩Rim = ∅.
Example 3. For example, in the model of Example 2, agent 1 has k1 = 3 actions and agent
2 has k2 = 2 actions. So k = 3 and m = dlog23e = 2. We have R1m = {rep11, rep12} and
R2m = {rep21, rep22}. Then for instance, we may represent the action of agent 1 corresponding
to R{1}(w) = {w, u, v} by the valuation ¬rep11 ∧ ¬rep12, the action of agent 1 corresponding
to {r, s} by rep11 ∧ ¬rep12, the action of agent 1 corresponding to {t, z} by ¬rep11 ∧ rep12,
the action of agent 2 corresponding to {w, r, t} by ¬rep21 ∧ ¬rep22 and the action of agent 2
corresponding to {u, v, s, z} by rep21 ∧ ¬rep22.
Let Rm =
⋃
j∈AGT Rjm be the set of all atomic propositions used to denote actions. Let
us define the following CP formula:
GRIDm
def
=
∧
x∈Rm [∅]((x→ 〈Rm \ {x}〉¬x) ∧ (¬x→ 〈Rm \ {x}〉x)) (4)
This formula enforces a CP model to be universal (over Rm), that is, to contain all possible
valuations over Rm (recall Definition 2). A model that satisfies GRIDm is then interpreted
as a game form where each valuation of Rjm represents an action of player j.
10. See Lorini and Schwarzentruber’s paper (2011) for a study of some decidable fragments of group STIT.
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Example 4. For instance, if some world of a CP model M′ satisfies GRID2, then the
‘skeleton’ of M′ should have the following form (we intentionally draw the ‘skeleton’ of the
model M′ so that it looks like the model M):
︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
worlds where
¬rep21 and ¬rep22
are true
worlds where
rep21 and ¬rep22
are true
}
worlds where
¬rep11 and ¬rep12 are true}
worlds where
rep11 and ¬rep12 are true}
worlds where
¬rep11 and rep12 are true
R{1}
R{2}
We now define a translation from LG−STIT to LCP(P) as follows:
tr2(p) = p for p ∈ P
tr2(¬ϕ) = ¬tr2(ϕ)
tr2(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr2(ϕ) ∧ tr2(ψ)
tr2([J : stit]ϕ) = [
⋃
j∈J
Rjm]tr2(ϕ)
The translation tr2 should be parameterized by m. For notational convenience, in what
follows we write tr2 instead of tr
m
2 leaving implicit the parameter m.
The set
⋃
j∈J Rjm represents all the atomic propositions used to represented actions of
the coalition J .
Example 5. For instance, with m = 2,
tr2([{1} : stit][{1, 2} : stit]p) = [{rep11, rep12}][{rep11, rep12, rep21, rep22}]p.
We then obtained the desired satisfiability-preservation result. The proof is given in
Appendix C.
Theorem 3. Let us consider a group STIT formula ϕ. Let m be an integer. Then the
following items are equivalent:
1. ϕ is STIT-satisfiable in a STIT-model where each agent has at most 2m actions;
2. ϕ is STIT-satisfiable in a STIT-model where each agent has exactly 2m actions;
3. GRIDm ∧ tr2(ϕ) is CP-satisfiable.
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3.3 Atemporal Individual STIT
In this subsection, we consider the following fragment of STIT called atemporal individual
STIT 11:
LI−STIT(P, AGT ) : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | [{j} : stit]ϕ
where p ranges over P and j ranges over AGT .
This fragment of STIT, axiomatized by Xu (1998), has the exponential finite model
property (see Lemma 7 in Balbiani et al., 2008b). Moreover, as the following theorem
highlights, it can be embedded in the logic CP.
Theorem 4. Let us consider a STIT formula ϕ of the individual STIT fragment. Let m be
the length of ϕ. Then the following three items are equivalent:
1. ϕ is STIT-satisfiable
2. ϕ is STIT-satisfiable in a model where each agent has at most 2m actions;
3. GRIDm ∧ tr2(ϕ) is CP-satisfiable.
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2 Consider a STIT formula ϕ of the individual STIT fragment. If ϕ is STIT-
satisfiable and m is the length of ϕ, then ϕ is STIT-satisfiable in a model where there are
at most 2m worlds (see Lemma 7 in Balbiani et al., 2008b). This implies that there are at
most 2m actions in that model. The implications 2 ⇒ 3 and 3 ⇒ 1 come from Theorem
3.
Thanks to Theorem 4, we reduce the NEXPTIME-complete satisfiability problem of
individual STIT (Balbiani et al., 2008b) to the CP-satisfiability problem. As the reduction
is polynomial, we obtain the following lower bound complexity result for the CP-satisfiability
problem.
Corollary 2. The CP-satisfiability problem is NEXPTIME-hard.
3.4 Group STIT where Coalitions Are Nested
In this subsection we address the satisfiability problem of the fragment of CP consisting of
formulae ϕ of LCP such that the sets of atomic propositions that appear in any operator [X]
occurring in ϕ form a linear set of sets of atomic propositions. More formally, if [X] and [X ′]
are two operators occurring in ϕ then either X ⊆ X ′ or X ′ ⊆ X. For instance, the formula
[{p, q}](ψ ∧ [{p}][{p, q, r, s}]ϕ) belongs to the fragment because {p} ⊆ {p, q} ⊆ {p, q, r, s}.
On the contrary, the formula [{p}]p ∧ [{q}]p is not an element of this fragment of CP.
We call the satisfiability problem of this fragment of CP the CP-nested satisfiability
problem. Due to the embedding proposed in Theorem 3 of STIT into CP, we provide the
following lower bound complexity result for the CP-nested satisfiability problem. The proof
is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 5. The CP-nested satisfiability problem is PSPACE-hard.
11. Some authors (e.g., Broersen, 2008; Wansing, 2006) use the term ‘multi-agent STIT’ to designate the
logic where operators are of the form [{j} : stit]. Here we prefer to use the more explicit term ‘individual
STIT’ as in Herzig and Schwarzentruber’s work (2008).
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The following theorem provides an upper bound complexity result for this fragment of
CP. The proof is given in Appendix E.
Theorem 6. The CP-nested satisfiability problem is in PSPACE.
This concludes our analysis of STIT logics via CP. In the next section we move to normal
coalition logic.
3.5 Normal Coalition Logic
We conclude this section on STIT by briefly mentioning a related system, normal coalition
logic. Normal coalition logic NCL was introduced by Broersen et al. (2007) to provide
an embedding in a normal modal logic of the influential—and non-normal—coalition logic
(Pauly, 2002). The embedding was based on a general simulation technique developed
by Gasquet and Herzig (1994) and showed for the first time how coalition logic—which
had already been recognized as the fragment of ATL containing only the ‘next’ operator
(Goranko, 2001)—could actually be interpreted on very traditional structures such as Kripke
frames based on equivalence relations. NCL was further studied by Balbiani et al. (2008a).
Also NCL has a known atemporal variant, introduced and studied by Balbiani et al. (2008a)
and Lorini and Schwarzentruber (2011).
Two results on atemporal NCL from the literature are worth mentioning in this context.
First, Balbiani et al. (2008a, Thm. 38) show that the satisfiability problem for atemporal
NCL (when |AGT | ≥ 2) is NEXPTIME-complete, like CP; second, Lorini and Schwarzen-
truber (2011, Prop. 1) show that when the |AGT | ≤ 2, then atemporal STIT is embeddable
in atemporal NCL and vice versa, and that an embedding (in both directions) in the general
case is possible only by considerably restricting the syntax of LSTIT.
4. The Ceteris Paribus Structure of Coalition Logic of Propositional
Control
In this section we study the relationships between CP, atemporal ‘bounded’ group STIT,
and another well-known game logic, the logic CL−PC (coalition logic of propositional con-
trol).12 Specifically, we show that CL−PC can be embedded, preserving satisfiability, into
atemporal ‘bounded’ group STIT and, by the fact that atemporal ‘bounded’ group STIT
can be embedded into CP (Section 3.1), we indirectly show that CL−PC can be embedded
into CP. To complete the picture we also provide a direct embedding from CL−PC to CP.
This latter embedding is of particular interest to highlight the striking similarities between
the models of CP and of CL−PC.
CL−PC was introduced by van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2005) as a formal language
for reasoning about capabilities of agents and coalitions in multiagent environments. In this
logic the notion of capability is modeled by means of the concept of control. In particular, it
is assumed that each agent i is associated with a specific finite subset Pi of the finite set of
all propositions P. Pi is the set of propositions controlled by the agent i. That is, the agent
i has the ability to assign a (truth) value to each proposition Pi but cannot affect the truth
12. In Gerbrandy’s work (2006) generalizations of some of the assumptions underlying CL−PC have been
studied. Here we only consider the original version of CL−PC proposed by van der Hoek and Wooldridge.
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values of the propositions in P \Pi. In the variant of CL−PC studied by van der Hoek and
Wooldridge (2005) it is also assumed that control over propositions is exclusive, that is, two
agents cannot control the same proposition (i.e., if i 6= j then Pi ∩Pj = ∅). Moreover, it is
assumed that control over propositions is complete, that is, every proposition is controlled
by at least one agent (i.e., for every p ∈ P there exists an agent i such that p ∈ Pi).
The preceding concepts and assumptions are precisely formulated in the following sec-
tion, which illustrates the syntax and the formal semantics of CL−PC.
4.1 Syntax and Semantics of CL−PC
The language of CL−PC is built from a finite set of atomic propositions P and a finite set
of agents AGT = {1, . . . , n}, and is defined by the following BNF:
LCL−PC(P, AGT ) : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ♦Jϕ
where p ranges over P and J ranges over 2AGT . Operator ♦J is called cooperation modality,
and the construction ♦Jϕ means that “group J has the contigent ability to achieve ϕ”.
Definition 5 (CL−PC model). A model for CL−PC is a tupleM = (P1, . . . ,Pn, X) where:
• P1, . . . ,Pn is a partition of P among the agents in AGT ;
• X ⊆ P is the set of propositions which are true in the initial state.
For every group of agents J ⊆ AGT , let PJ =
⋃
i∈J Pi be the set of atomic propositions
controlled by the group J . Moreover, for every group J ⊆ AGT and for every set of atomic
propositions X ⊆ P, let XJ = X ∩PJ be the set of atomic propositions in X controlled by
the group J . Sets XJ are called J-valuations.
Given a CL−PC model M = (P1, . . . ,Pn, X), the truth conditions of CL−PC formulae
are the following:
M |=CL−PC p ⇐⇒ p ∈ X;
M |=CL−PC ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M 6|=CL−PC ϕ;
M |=CL−PC ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M |=CL−PC ϕ andM |=CL−PC ψ;
M |=CL−PC ♦Jϕ ⇐⇒ ∃X ′J ⊆ PJ :M
⊕
X ′J |=CL−PC ϕ
where M⊕X ′J is the CL−PC model (P1, . . . ,Pn, X ′′) such that:
X ′′AGT\J = XAGT\J
X ′′J = X
′
J
That is, ♦Jϕ is true at a given modelM if and only if, the coalition J can change the truth
values of the atoms that it controls in such a way that ϕ will be true afterwards (i.e., given
the actual truth-value combination of the atoms which are not controlled by J , there exists
a truth-value combination of the atoms controlled by J which ensures ϕ).
Let us illustrate the CL−PC semantics with an example.
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Example 6. Let AGT = {1, 2, 3}, P = {p, q, r}, P1 = {p}, P2 = {q} and P3 = {r}.
Consider the CL−PC model M = (P1,P2, ,P3, {r}). We have that:
M |=CL−PC ♦{1,2}((p ∧ q ∧ r) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q ∧ r)).
Indeed, there exists a set of atoms X ′{1,2} ⊆ P{1,2} controlled by {1, 2} such that
M⊕X ′{1,2} |=CL−PC ((p∧ q ∧ r)∨ (p∧¬q ∧ r)). An example is X ′{1,2} = {p} ⊆ P{1,2}, from
which, (P1,P2,P3, {p, r}) |=CL−PC ((p ∧ q ∧ r) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q ∧ r)) where (P1,P2,P3, {p, r}) =
M⊕ {p}.
4.2 Embedding CL−PC into STIT
The aim of this section is to provide an embedding of CL−PC into the variant of atempo-
ral group STIT with bounded choices (atemporal ‘bounded’ group STIT) that have been
presented in Section 3.1.
Let us provide the following STIT formulae which catpure four basic assumptions of
CL−PC:
EXC +
def
=
∧
p∈P
∧
i,j∈AGT :i 6=j
(〈∅ : stit〉[{i} : stit]p→ ¬〈∅ : stit〉[{j} : stit]p) (5)
EXC− def=
∧
p∈P
∧
i,j∈AGT :i 6=j
(〈∅ : stit〉[{i} : stit]p→ ¬〈∅ : stit〉[{j} : stit]¬p) (6)
COMPL
def
=
∧
p∈P
∨
i∈AGT
[∅ : stit]([{i} : stit]p ∨ [{i} : stit]¬p) (7)
GRID∗ def=
∧
X⊆P
〈∅ : stit〉
∧
p∈X
p ∧
∧
p∈P\X
¬p
 (8)
Formulae EXC + and EXC− mean that control over atomic propositions in P is exclusive
(i.e., there is no proposition in P which can be forced to be true or false by more than one
agent), whereas formula COMPL means that exercise of control over atomic propositions in
P is complete (i.e., for every proposition in P there exists at least one agent who either forces
it to be true or forces it to be false). Finally, formula GRID∗ means that all the possible
truth-value combinations of the atomic propositions in P are possible. Note that EXC +,
EXC−, COMPL and GRID∗ are well-formed STIT formulae because of the assumption that
the set P is finite.13
We define the following translation from LCL−PC(P, AGT ) to LSTIT(P, AGT ):
tr3(p) = p for p ∈ P
tr3(¬ϕ) = ¬tr3(ϕ)
tr3(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr3(ϕ) ∧ tr3(ψ)
tr3(♦Jϕ) = 〈AGT \ J : stit〉tr3(ϕ)
The following theorem highlights that ‘bounded’ group STIT embeds CL−PC. The proof
is given in Appendix F.
13. This assumption is also made by van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2005).
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Theorem 7. Let m = |P|. Then, a CL−PC formula ϕ is CL−PC-satisfiable if and only if
(EXC + ∧ EXC− ∧ COMPL ∧ GRID∗) ∧ tr3(ϕ) is satisfiable in a STIT model where each
agent has at most 2m actions.
As CP embeds atemporal ‘bounded’ group STIT (Theorem 3 in Section 3.1), from The-
orem 7 it follows that CP also embeds CL−PC. Indeed, given a CL−PC-satisfiable formula
ϕ, one can use the translation tr2 given in Section 3.1 in order to find a corresponding STIT
formula which is STIT-satisfiable. Then, one uses the preceding translation tr3 in order to
find a corresponding CP formula which is CP-satisfiable.
Corollary 3. Let m = |P|. Then, a CL−PC formula ϕ is CL−PC-satisfiable if and only if
GRIDm ∧ tr2((EXC + ∧ EXC− ∧ COMPL ∧GRID∗) ∧ tr3(ϕ)) is CP-satisfiable.
4.3 Directly Embedding CL−PC into CP
To complete the picture, we study here a direct embedding of CL−PC into CP.
Definition 6 (From CL−PC to CP models). Let M = (P1, . . . ,Pn, X) be a CL−PC-model.
Define MCP = (W,V ) as follows:
• W = 2P;
• V is such that V (p) = {w | p ∈ w} for all p ∈ P.
Intuitively, V is such that any truth-assignment on P is witnessed by exactly one
w ∈ W and wX is the witness of the truth assignment represented by X (i.e., makes
all atoms in X true and the rest false). SoMCP is a non-redundant universal CP model and
MCP, X is a pointed CP-model (Definition 2). Now define the following translation from
LCL−PC(P, AGT ), and a partition P1, . . . ,Pn of P, to LCP(P):
tr4(p) = p for p ∈ P
tr4(¬ϕ) = ¬tr4(ϕ)
tr4(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr4(ϕ) ∧ tr4(ψ)
tr4(♦Jϕ) = 〈YJ〉tr4(ϕ)
where YJ = −
⋃
j∈AGT Pj (i.e., the atoms that are not controlled by anybody in J).
Theorem 8. Let M = (P1, . . . ,Pn, X) be a CL−PC-model and ϕ ∈ LCL−PC(P, AGT ):
M |=CL−PC ϕ ⇐⇒ MCP, X |=CP tr4(ϕ)
Proof. We proceed by induction on the syntax of ϕ. Base Trivial by the construction of
MCP (Definition 6). Step The cases for the Boolean connectives are straightforward. We
focus on the modal case:
M |=CL−PC ♦Jϕ ⇐⇒ MCP, X |=CP 〈YJ〉tr4(ϕ)
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where YJ = −
⋃
j∈N Pj . The case is proven by the following series of equivalences:
M |=CL−PC ♦Jϕ ⇐⇒ ∃X ′J ⊆ PJ :M
⊕
X ′J |=CL−PC ϕ
Semantics of ♦J
⇐⇒ ∃X ′J ⊆ PJ : (P1, . . . ,Pn, X ′J ∪XAGT\J) |=CL−PC ϕ
Definition of
⊕
⇐⇒ ∃X ′J ⊆ PJ :MCP, X ′J ∪XAGT\J |=CP tr4(ϕ)
Definition 6 and IH
⇐⇒ ∃Y ∼YJ X andMCP, Y |=CP tr4(ϕ)
Definition 1
⇐⇒ MCP, X |=CP 〈YJ〉tr4(ϕ)
Definition 3
This completes the proof.
5. The Ceteris Paribus Structure of Dynamic Logic of Propositional
Assignments
The dynamic logic of propositional assignments (DL−PA) is the concrete variant of proposi-
tional dynamic logic (PDL) (Harel et al., 2000) in which atomic programs are assignments of
propositional variables to true or to false.14 The complexities of the model checking and of
the satisfiability problem for DL−PA have been recently studied by Balbiani et al. (2013).
The starless version of DL−PA was previously studied by van Eijck (2000) and recently
put to use by Herzig et al. (2011), who have shown that it embeds CL−PC. In the next
section we study the relationship between CP and DL−PA. Specifically, we provide a truth-
preserving embedding of starless DL−PA into CP as well as a truth-preserving embedding
of CP into DL−PA.
DL−PA, it has been argued by Herzig et al. (2011), represents a very general and—
because of its direct link with PDL—natural formalism for reasoning about agency. The
results in this section, we argue, point to a similar status for CL−PC, modulo the use of the
Kleene star about which we will comment in Section 7.
14. Programs in standard PDL are abstract as they are just letters a, b, . . . from some alphabet.
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5.1 Syntax and Semantics of DL−PA
The language of DL−PA is built from a finite set of atomic propositions P and is defined
by the following BNF:
pi ::= +p | −p | pi;pi | pi ∪ pi | pi∗ | ϕ?
LDL−PA(P) : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | 〈pi〉ϕ
We will use ±p to denote (+p ∪ −p).
Definition 7 (DL−PA model). A DL−PA-model is a set X ⊆ P.
That is, a DL−PA model is a propositional valuation.
The semantics is given by induction as follows:
• J+pK = {(X,X ′) | X ′ = X ∪ {p}};
• J−pK = {(X,X ′) | X ′ = X − {p}};
• Jpi;pi′K = JpiK ◦ Jpi′K;
• Jpi ∪ pi′K = JpiK ∪ Jpi′K;
• Jpi∗K = ⋃k∈N JpiKk;
• Jϕ?K = {(X,X) | X ∈ JϕK};
• JpK = {X | p ∈ X};
• J¬ϕK = 2P − JϕK;
• Jϕ ∨ ψK = JϕK ∪ JψK;
• J〈pi〉ϕK = {X | there exists X ′ s.th. (X,X ′) ∈ JpiK and X ′ ∈ JϕK}.
We write X |=DL−PA ϕ for X ∈ JϕK. We will refer to the fragment of DL−PA without ∗
operator as starless DL−PA.
5.2 Some Properties of DL−PA
Like in PDL, program constructors ; ,∪ and ? are eliminable:
Fact 2. The following are DL−PA validities:
〈pi;pi′〉ϕ ↔ 〈pi〉〈pi′〉ϕ
〈pi ∪ pi′〉ϕ ↔ 〈pi〉ϕ ∨ 〈pi′〉ϕ
〈ψ?〉ϕ ↔ ψ ∧ ϕ
However, unlike in PDL, the ∗ operator is also eliminable in DL−PA:
Fact 3 (Balbiani et al., 2013). For every ϕ ∈ LCL−PC(P) there exists ϕ′ ∈ LCL−PC(P) such
that ϕ↔ ϕ′ is DL−PA valid.
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5.3 Embedding Starless DL−PA into CP
By a direct adaptation of Definition 6 above, a DL−PA model X can be translated to the
pointed CP model MCP, X defined in Definition 6. Now fix the following translation:15
tr5(p) = p for p ∈ P
tr5(¬ϕ) = ¬tr5(ϕ)
tr5(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr5(ϕ) ∧ tr5(ψ)
tr5(〈+p〉ϕ) = 〈P \ {p}〉(p ∧ tr5(ϕ))
tr5(〈−p〉ϕ) = 〈P \ {p}〉(¬p ∧ tr5(ϕ))
Notice that the translation from starless DL−PA to CP does not need to include the cases
for sequential composition (;), nondeterministic choice (∪) and test (ϕ?) since they are
eliminable in DL−PA. Therefore, it guarantees that in CP we could do the same kind of
reasoning as in starless DL−PA:
Theorem 9. Let X be a DL−PA model and ϕ belong to the language of starless DL−PA:
X |=DL−PA ϕ ⇐⇒ MCP, X |=CP tr5(ϕ)
Proof. We proceed by induction on the syntax of ϕ. Base Trivial by the construction of
MCP (Definition 6). Step The cases for the Boolean connectives are straightforward. We
focus on the modal case:
X |=DL−PA 〈+p〉ϕ ⇐⇒ MCP, X |=CP 〈P \ {p}〉tr5(ϕ)
The case is proven by the following series of equivalences:
X |=DL−PA 〈+p〉ϕ ⇐⇒ X ∪ {p} |=DL−PA ϕ Semantics of 〈+p〉
⇐⇒ ∃Y ∼P−{p} X :MCP, Y |=CP tr5(ϕ) Definition 1 and IH
⇐⇒ MCP, X |=CP 〈P \ {p}〉tr5(ϕ) Definition 3
The case for 〈−p〉 is identical.
5.4 Embedding of CP into Starless DL−PA
The above subsection has shown that the semantics of CP and DL−PA are closely related.
However, DL−PA has a built-in assumption to the effect that any valuation (i.e., set of
atoms) is feasible. From the point of view of CP this means that DL−PA actually works with
universal models (cf. Definition 2). Here, we establish an embedding from CP interpreted
on universal models,16 to starless DL−PA. Consider the following translation from LCP(P)
15. It must be observed that for this translation to work P should be finite. If not, then −{p} is co-finite
and ♦−{p} would not belong to LCP.
16. This is the class of models one can axiomatize by extending the axiom system of Figure 2 with axioms
of form 〈∅〉δ where δ ranges over propositional formulae encoding one single valuation.
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into LDL−PA(P):
tr7(p) = p for p ∈ P
tr7(¬ϕ) = ¬tr7(ϕ)
tr7(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr7(ϕ) ∧ tr7(ψ)
tr7(〈X〉ϕ) = 〈±p1〉 . . . 〈±pn〉tr7(ϕ)
where p1, . . . , pn is an enumeration of the atoms in P \X.17 We have the following result:
Theorem 10. Let M be an CP-model and ϕ ∈ LCP(P):
M, w |=CP ϕ ⇐⇒ w |=DL−PA tr7(ϕ)
Proof. We proceed by induction on the syntax of ϕ. Base Trivial by the construction of
MCP (Definition 6). Step The cases for the Boolean connectives are straightforward. We
focus on the modal case:
M, w |=CP 〈X〉ϕ ⇐⇒ w |=DL−PA 〈±p1〉 . . . 〈±pn〉tr7(ϕ)
where p1, . . . , pn is an enumeration of the atoms in P\X. The case is proven by the following
series of equivalences:
M, w |=CP 〈X〉ϕ ⇐⇒ ∃w′ ∼X w s.t. M, w′ |=CP ϕ Definition 1
⇐⇒ ∃w′ ∼X w s.t. w′ |=DL−PA tr7(ϕ) IH
⇐⇒ ∃w′ s.t. w′ = (. . . (wF{p1})F . . .)F{pn}
and w′ |=DL−PA tr7(ϕ) Definition 1
⇐⇒ w |=DL−PA 〈±p1〉 . . . 〈±pn〉tr7(ϕ) Semantics of DL−PA
where F ∈ {∪,−}, and p1, . . . , pn is an enumeration of the atoms in P−X.
From Theorem 10 we can obtain as corollary a satisfiability-preserving embedding of CP
in DL−PA. Fix the formula18
GRID∗∗ def=
∧
X⊆P
〈∅〉
∧
p∈X
p ∧
∧
p∈P\X
¬p
 (9)
which, it is easy to see, forces a CP-model to contain all propositional valuations from P.
We then have:
Corollary 4. Let ϕ ∈ LCP(P). Then, tr7(ϕ) is DL−PA satisfiable iff GRID∗∗ ∧ ϕ is CP
satisfiable.
This concludes the presentation of the embeddings of STIT, CL−PC and DL−PA into
CP (Figure 1). In the following section we take stock commenting on the technical results
presented and drawing links with related work.
17. Again, it is crucial that P be finite.
18. Cf. Formula (8).
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6. Discussion and Related Work
In this section we provide a summary of the results presented and discuss their implications.
We also position our work with respect to existing contributions in the literature on logic
and games.
6.1 Discussion
The paper has introduced a modal logic that arises naturally by interpreting modal opera-
tors on the equivalence relations induced by finite sets of propositional atoms. This logic,
called CP, has been axiomatized and embedded (exponentially) into S5. CP has then been
used as a tool to compare three logics of one-shot strategic interaction—atemporal STIT,
the coalitional logic of propositional control CL−PC and the dynamic logic of propositional
assignments DL−PA. All these logics have been embedded into CP.
These embeddings (recall Figure 1) put us in the position to to draw the following
general remarks.
• It appears to be justified to talk about a common ceteris paribus structure underpin-
ning several of the main logics of game forms as they are all embeddable into CP.
This illustrates a striking uniformity in the logical tools needed for expressing choice
and effectivity of games in logical languages, and CP appears to offer a well-suited
abstraction for systematizing existing formalisms.
• Furthermore, all these logics are embeddable in S5 (either directly or via CP), high-
lighting the fact that in order to reason about choice and effectivity in games one
essentially reasons over suitably defined partitions of the state space.
• New interesting and so far unexplored embeddings are obtainable as corollaries. In
particular, it follows from our results that atemporal STIT on bounded models can be
embedded into starless DL−PA via CP.
• Via logic S5, one can easily show that embeddings in the other directions are also
possible (albeit at exponential cost), so that all arrows in Figure 1 may actually
be made symmetric. S5 embeds CP, but it is also directly embeddable in all the
mentioned logic, as they all contain the universal modality, in the following forms: 〈∅〉
in CP, 〈AGT \ ∅ : stit〉 in atemporal STIT, ♦AGT in CL−PC and 〈±p1〉 . . . 〈±pn〉 in
DL−PA (where p1, . . . , pn is an enumeration of P).
All in all our results unveil a striking—and to some extent unexpected—uniformity
underpinning all the formalisms we considered.
6.2 Related Work
We review two sets of related contributions.
6.2.1 CP and Modal Ceteris Paribus Logics
There are two logics in the modal logic literature that are strictly related to CP: release
logic, and the logic of ceteris paribus preference.
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Release logic is a relatively less known formalism in the landscape of modal logics for
artificial intelligence. It has been introduced and studied by Krabbendam and Meyer (2003,
2000) in order to provide a modal logic characterization of a general notion of irrelevancy.
Modal operators in release logic are S5 operators indexed by subsets of a finite set Iss of
abstract elements denoting the issues that are taken to be irrelevant, or that can be released,
while evaluating the formula in the scope of the operator. A release model is therefore a tuple
(W, {∼rX}X⊆Iss, V ) where all ∼rX are equivalence relations with the additional constraint
that if X ⊆ Y then ∼rX⊆∼rY , that is, by releasing more issues one obtains a more coarse
equivalence relation. Formally, this is the semantics of release operators:
M, w |= ♦Xϕ ⇐⇒ ∃w′ ∈W : w ∼rX w′ andM, w′ |= ϕ
where X ⊆ Iss and M = (W, {∼rX}X⊆Iss, V ).
One can easily observe that, by Fact 1 (clause (ii)), CP models are release models where
Iss = P and where the release relation ∼rX=∼−X . Vice versa, for Iss = P, not all release
models are CP models. As a consequence, the logic of 〈−X〉 operators in CP is a conservative
extension of the logic of ♦X release operators.
Preference logic has also long been concerned with so-called ceteris paribus preferences,
that is, preferences incorporating an “all other things being equal” condition. A first logical
analysis of such preferences dates back to Von Wright’s work (1963), where dyadic modal
operators are studied representing statements like ‘ϕ is preferred to ψ, ceteris paribus’. More
recently, van Benthem et al. (2009) studied a modal logic of ceteris paribus preferences based
on standard unary modal operators. Leaving the preferential component of such logic aside,
its ceteris paribus fragment concerns sentences of the form 〈Γ〉ϕ whose intuitive meaning
is “there exists a state which is equivalent to the current (evaluation) state with respect to
all the formulae in the (finite) set Γ and which satisfies ϕ”, where the formulae in Γ are not
only atoms but formulae from the full language. Logic CP is, therefore, a fragment of the
ceteris paribus logic studied by van Benthem et al. where Γ is allowed to consist only of a
finite set of atoms.
6.2.2 Other Contributions to a Systematization of Game Logics
Despite the wealth of approaches that can be found in the literature on game logics, only very
few papers have attempted some form of comparison spanning across several formalisms,
and attempting some kind of systematization. Two in particular are worth mentioning here.
The most recent one is Herzig’s work (2014), which provides a very comprehensive
analysis of the field by classifying the existing logics depending on what aspects of agency
(e.g., whether they capture strategic interaction or not, whether they handle uncertainty
and epistemic attitudes) they capture in their languages. The logics we considered in this
paper, for instance, would fall into the strategic and no uncertainty categories according to
the terminology used by Herzig. This analysis is conceptual and predominantly driven by
syntactic features of the logics, that is, by the theorems about agency that they enable.
An earlier work which is methodologically closer to ours in its focus on semantics is
Goranko and Jamroga’s work (2004). That paper compares ATL, its epistemic variant ATEL
(epistemic ATL, van der Hoek & Wooldridge, 2003) and ECL (extended CL,19 Pauly, 2001)
19. This is CL extended with a Kleene star operator.
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providing constructive transformations between their models and establishing, in particular,
that ATL subsumes ECL and that ATEL can be embedded into ATL preserving satisfiability.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
The paper has provided a unification of the, to date, most influential logics for the repre-
sentation of one-shot strategic interaction—atemporal STIT, CL−PC and starless DL−PA—
under the ceteris paribus abstraction formalized in logic CP.
One natural future research direction presents itself, which consists in extending logic
CP with a Kleene star operator, in analogy with DL−PA. We conjecture DL−PA to be
embeddable into CP with Kleene star and it remains to be investigated whether such new
logic could play the same unifying role for logics of extensive form games, that we show it
plays in the atemporal case. This will complete the systematization program initiated by
the current paper.
Related to the above question, but in a somewhat more technical vein, we have shown
in this paper that CP and atemporal individual STIT have the same high complexity of
the satisfiability problem when we consider the whole languages. The study of efficient
syntactic fragments is then important and we intend to pursue this study in parallel both
for CP and for atemporal individual STIT. We expect that several complexity results about
fragments of atemporal STIT may be transferred to fragments of CP and viceversa.
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Appendix A. Proof of Claim (†) in Theorem 1
Proof. One can show that REP is derivable for every operator [X] as follows: first one shows
that each [X] operator satisfies the Axiom K and the rule of necessitation N.
We provide here below the syntactic proofs of these two claims. For notational conve-
nience we use the following abbreviation:
Ŷ
def
=
∧
p∈Y
p ∧
∧
p∈X\Y
¬p

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Derivation of K for [X]:
1. `CP [X](ϕ→ ψ)↔
∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ → [∅]
(
Ŷ → (ϕ→ ψ)
))
by Reduce
2. `CP
(
Ŷ → (ϕ→ ψ)
)
→
(
(Ŷ → ϕ)→ (Ŷ → ψ)
)
by P
3. `CP
∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ → [∅]
(
Ŷ → (ϕ→ ψ)
))
→
∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ → [∅]
(
(Ŷ → ϕ)→ (Ŷ → ψ)
))
by P, 2 and rule RM for [∅] (i.e., if ` ϕ→ ψ then ` [∅]ϕ→ [∅]ψ)
4. `CP
∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ → [∅]
(
(Ŷ → ϕ)→ (Ŷ → ψ)
))
→
∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ →
(
[∅](Ŷ → ϕ)→ [∅](Ŷ → ψ)
))
by K and P
5. `CP
∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ →
(
[∅](Ŷ → ϕ)→ [∅](Ŷ → ψ)
))
→
 ∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ → [∅]
(
Ŷ → ϕ
))
→
∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ → [∅]
(
Ŷ → ψ
))
by P
6. `CP (
∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ → [∅]
(
Ŷ → ϕ
))
→
∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ → [∅]
(
Ŷ → ψ
))
)↔ ([X]ϕ→ [X]ψ)
by Reduce
7. `CP [X](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([X]ϕ→ [X]ψ)
from 1 and 3-6
Derivation of N for [X]:
1. `CP ϕ
hypothesis
2. `CP [∅]ϕ
from 1 by N for [∅]
3. `CP
∧
Y⊆X
[∅]
(
Ŷ → ϕ
)
from 2 by the S5 theorem [∅]ϕ→ [∅](ψ → ϕ)
4. `CP
∧
Y⊆X
(
Ŷ → [∅]
(
Ŷ → ϕ
))
from 3 by P
5. `CP [X]ϕ
from 4 by Reduce and MP
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Then one proves that REP is derivable by an induction routine analogous to the one used
by Chellas (1980, Thm. 4.7).
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
Let ϕ0 be a CP-formula. We have equivalence between ϕ0 is CP-satisfiable and tr(ϕ0) is
S5-satisfiable.
Proof. ⇒ Suppose that there exists a CP-model M = (W,V ) and a world w ∈ W such
that M, w |=CP ϕ0. Let V ′ be the valuation V modified such that pϕ is true in exactly all
worlds u such that M, u |=CP ϕ. Let M′ be the S5-model defined as (W,V ′). A standard
induction provides that M′, w |=S5 tr(ϕ0). More precisely, let us prove by induction that
for all ϕ ∈ SF (ϕ0), we have M, u |=CP ϕ iff M′, u |=S5 tr1(ϕ) for all u ∈W .
• Propositional case: for all atomic propositions p, we have M, u |=CP p iff u ∈ V (p) iff
u ∈ V ′(p) iff M′, u |=S5 tr1(p).
• Negation: M, u |=CP ¬ϕ iff M, u 6|=CP ϕ iff M′, u 6|=S5 tr1(ϕ) iff M′, u |=S5 tr1(¬ϕ).
• Conjunction: M, u |=CP ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, u |=CP ϕ and M, u |=CP ψ iff M′, u |=S5 tr1(ϕ)
and M′, u |=S5 tr1(ψ) iff M′, u |=S5 tr1(ϕ ∧ ψ).
• Case of a formula of the form [X]ϕ:
M, u |=CP [X]ϕ
iff for all v ∈W , u ∼VX v implies M, v |=CP ϕ
iff for all v ∈W , u ∼VX v implies M′, v |=S5 pϕ
(by construction of V ′)
iff M′, u |=S5 tr1([X])ϕ
By construction of V ′, we haveM′, w |=S5
∧
ϕ∈SF (ϕ0)(pϕ ↔ tr1(ϕ)). AsM, w |=CP ϕ0 we
have M′, w |=S5 tr1(ϕ0) thus M′, w |=S5 pϕ0 by construction of V ′. As a result, M′, w |=S5
tr(ϕ0).
⇐ Suppose that there exists a S5 model M′ = (W,V ) and a world w ∈ W such that
M′, w |=S5 tr(ϕ0). We define the relations ∼X where X ⊆ P as in the Definition 1. Let
M be the CP-model equal to (W,V ). A standard induction provides that M, w |=CP ϕ0.
More precisely, let us prove by induction that for all ϕ ∈ SF (ϕ0), we have M, u |=CP ϕ iff
M′, u |=S5 tr1(ϕ) for all u ∈W .
• Propositional case: for all atomic propositions p, we have M, u |=CP p iff u ∈ V (p) iff
u ∈ V ′(p) iff M′, u |=S5 tr1(p).
• Negation: M, u |=CP ¬ϕ iff M, u 6|=CP ϕ iff M′, u 6|=S5 ϕ iff M′, u |=S5 ¬ϕ.
• Conjunction: M, u |=CP ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, u |=CP ϕ and M, u |=CP ψ iff M′, u |=S5 tr1(ϕ)
and M′, u |=S5 tr1(ψ) iff M′, u |=S5 tr1(ϕ ∧ ψ).
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• Case of a formula of the form [X]ϕ:
M, u |=CP [X]ϕ
iff for all v ∈W , u ∼VX v implies M, v |=CP ϕ
iff for all v ∈W , u ∼VX v implies M′, v |=S5 tr1(ϕ)
(by induction)
iff for all v ∈W , u ∼VX v implies M′, v |=S5 pϕ
(because, as M′, w |=S5 tr(ϕ0) we have that
for all v ∈W , M′, v |=S5 (pϕ ↔ tr1(ϕ)))
iff M′, u |=S5 tr1([X])ϕ
As M′, w |=S5 tr(ϕ0), we have that M′, w |=S5 (pϕ0 ↔ tr1(ϕ0)) and M′, w |=S5 pϕ0 . Thus,
M′, w |=S5 tr1(ϕ0). Hence M, w |=CP ϕ0.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3
Let us consider a group STIT formula ϕ. Let m be an integer. Then the following items
are equivalent:
1. ϕ is satisfiable in a model where each agent has at most 2m actions;
2. ϕ is satisfiable in a model where each agent has exactly 2m actions;
3. GRIDm ∧ tr2(ϕ) is CP-satisfiable.
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2 Let M0 = (W 0, {R0J}J⊆AGT , V 0) be a STIT-model with at most 2m actions
per agent and w ∈ W 0 such that M0, w |=STIT ϕ. We construct a sequence of models
Mj = (W j , {RjJ}J⊆AGT , V j) such that all agents j′ ∈ {1, . . . , j} have exactly 2m actions
in Mj and such that Mj is bisimilar to Mj−1. We construct Mj from Mj−1 as follows.
Let Rj−1{j} (w1), . . . , R
j−1
{j} (wk) be an enumeration of R
j−1
{j} - classes (that is, actions for agents
j), where k ≤ 2m. Let (Copy`)`∈{k+1,...,2m} be a family of disjoint copies of Rj−1{j} (w1).
We write uCv to say that u = v or v is a copy of u or u is a copy of v. The model
Mj = (W j , {RjJ}J⊆AGT , V j) is defined as follows:
• W j = W j−1 ∪⋃`∈{k+1,...,2m}Copy`;
• Rj{j} = Rj−1{j} ∪
⋃
`∈{k+1,...,2m} {(u, v) | u, v ∈ Copy`}
• Rj{j′} = C ◦Rj−1{j′} ◦C for all j′ 6= j;
• V j(p) = {v ∈W j | vCu and u ∈ V j−1(p)}.
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This construction makes thatMj andMj−1 are bisimilar and by induction we have that
all agents j′ ∈ {1, . . . , j} have exactly 2m actions in Mj . Finally, we have Mn, w |=STIT ϕ
and each agent has exactly 2m actions in Mn.
2 ⇒ 3 Let us consider a STIT model
M = (W, {RJ}J⊆AGT , V ) in which each agent has exactly 2m actions. Let w ∈ W be
such that M, w |=STIT ϕ. For all j ∈ AGT , let R{j}(wj,1), . . . , R{j}(wj,2m) be an enumer-
ation of all R{j}-classes in M. Let us extend V such that in all worlds of R{j}(wj,i) the
valuations of the atomic propositions in Rj correspond to the binary digits in the binary
representation of i. For all d ∈ {1, . . . ,m}:
V (repjd) =
⋃
i=1..2m| the dth digit of i is 1
R{j}(wj,i) (10)
Independence of agents inM ensures thatM, w |=CP GRIDm. We prove thatM, u |=CP
tr2(ψ) iff M, u |=STIT ψ by induction over all subformulae ψ of ϕ.
3 ⇒ 1 Let M = (W,V ) be a CP-model and w ∈ W such that M, w |=CP GRIDm ∧
tr2(ϕ). We define RJ =∼⋃
j∈J Rj . The resulting Kripke-model M′ = (W, {RJ}J⊆AGT , V )
is a STIT-model where each agent has exactly 2m actions. In particular, it satisfies the
independence of agents because M, w |=CP GRIDm. We prove that M, u |=CP tr2(ψ) iff
M′, u |=STIT ψ by induction over all subformulae ψ of ϕ.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 5
The CP-nested satisfiability problem is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. We reduce the satisfiability problem of STIT-formulae where coalitions are taken
from a linear set of coalitions, which is PSPACE-complete (Schwarzentruber, 2012) to the
CP-nested satisfiability problem: we use the translation tr2 of Subsection 3.1. Let ϕ be a
STIT-formula. We have ϕ is STIT-satisfiable iff tr2(ϕ) is CP-satisfiable.
⇒ As it stated by Schwarzentruber (2012), the STIT where coalitions are taken from
a linear set of coalitions has the exponential model property. So the result of Theorem 3 is
true. Hence if ϕ is STIT-satisfiable then GRIDm ∧ tr2(ϕ) is CP-satisfiable (where m is the
length of ϕ). Hence tr2(ϕ) is CP-satisfiable.
⇐ Suppose that there exists a CP-model M = (W,V ) and w ∈ W such that M, w |=
tr2(ϕ). We define RJ =∼⋃
j∈J . Then the STIT model M′ = (W, (RJ)J∈ϕ, V ) is such that
M′, w |= ϕ. Remark that we do not need to specify all the relations RJ for all J . As long
as RJ is specified for all coalitions J that appear in ϕ and that RJ ⊆ RJ ′ if J ′ ⊆ J , we can
extend the Kripke model M′ to a completely specified STIT-model also satisfying ϕ.20
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 6
The CP-nested satisfiability problem is in PSPACE.
Proof. We reduce the CP-nested satisfiability problem to the satisfiability problem of STIT
where coalitions are taken from a linear set of coalitions. We defineAX = {jp such that p ∈ X}
20. See Schwarzentruber’s paper (2012) for more details about this construnction.
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where jp is a fresh agent corresponding to the atomic proposition p. Let us define the fol-
lowing translation:
• tr(p) = p;
• tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ);
• tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr′(ψ);
• tr([X]ϕ) = [AX : stit]tr(ϕ).
Let us consider a fixed CP-formula ϕ. We recall that a signature X appears in ϕ if there
exists a formula ψ such that 〈X〉ψ ∈ SF (ϕ). We have also to define the following formula
CONTROL = [∅ : stit]∧X appearing in ϕ∧
p∈X(p↔ [AX : stit]p) ∧ (¬p↔ [AX : stit]¬p).
tr(ϕ) ∧ CONTROL is a STIT-formula which is computable in polynomial time and which
satisfies the condition of nesting over groups (i.e., for any two operators [J : stit] and
[J ′ : stit] occurring in the formula either J ⊆ J ′ or J ′ ⊆ J). We also have that ϕ is
CP-satisfiable iff tr(ϕ) ∧ CONTROL is satisfiable in a STIT-model.
⇒ Suppose that there exists an CP-model M = (W,V ) and w ∈ W such that
M, w |=CP ϕ. We define RAX =∼X . Then the STIT model M′ = (W, (RAX )X∈ϕ, V ) is
such that M′, w |=STIT tr(ϕ) ∧ CONTROL. Remark that we do not need to specify all
the relations RJ for all J . As long as RJ is specified for all coalitions J that appear in
tr(ϕ) ∧ CONTROL and that RJ ⊆ RJ ′ if J ′ ⊆ J , we can extend the Kripke model M′ to
a completely specified STIT-model also satisfying tr(ϕ) ∧ CONTROL.21
⇐ Suppose that there exists a STIT-model
M′ = (W, (RAX )X∈ϕ, V ) and a world w ∈ W such that M′, w |=STIT tr(ϕ) ∧ CONTROL.
As M′, w |= CONTROL, we have ∼X= RAX . This is the reason why we define M =
(W, {∼X}X∈2P , V ). Consequently, we have M, w |=CP ϕ.
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 7
Let m = |P|. Then, a CL−PC formula ϕ is CL−PC satisfiable if and only if (EXC + ∧
EXC− ∧COMPL∧GRID∗)∧ tr3(ϕ) is satisfiable in a STIT model where each agent has at
most 2m actions.
Proof. Let us suppose |P| = m.
⇒ Let M∗ = (P1, . . . ,Pn, X∗) be a CL−PC model such that M∗ |=CL−PC ϕ, where
P1, . . . ,Pn is a partition of P among the agents in AGT . We build the STIT
model M = (W, {RJ}J⊆AGT , V ) as follows:
• W = {X : X ⊆ P},
• for all J ⊆ AGT and for all X,X ′ ∈W , (X,X ′) ∈ R′J if and only if XJ = X ′J ,
21. Again see Schwarzentruber’s paper for more details about this construction.
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• for all p ∈ P and for all X ∈W , X ∈ V (p) if and only if p ∈ X,
where for any X ⊆ P and for any J ⊆ AGT , XJ = X ∩PJ (with PJ =
⋃
i∈J Pi). The size
of M is 2m. It follows that the number of RAGT -equivalence classes (alias joint actions) is
equal or lower than 2m. Consequently, the number of actions for every agent is bounded by
2m.
It is straightforward to prove that for all X ∈ W we have M, X |=STIT EXC + ∧
EXC− ∧ COMPL ∧ GRID∗. Moreover, by induction on the structure of ϕ, we prove that
M, X∗ |=STIT tr3(ϕ). The only interesting case is ϕ = ♦Jψ:
M∗ |=CL−PC ♦Jψ iff there exists XJ ⊆ PJ s.t. M∗
⊕
XJ |=CL−PC ψ
iff there exists XJ ⊆ PJ s.t.
M, XJ ∪X∗AGT\J |=STIT tr3(ψ) (by I.H.)
iff M, X∗ |=STIT 〈AGT \ J : stit〉tr3(ψ)
⇐ Let M = (W, {RJ}J⊆AGT , V ) be a STIT model where the number of actions for
every agent is bounded by 2m and w0 ∈ W such that M, w0 |=STIT (EXC + ∧ EXC− ∧
COMPL ∧GRID∗) ∧ tr3(ϕ).
For any i ∈ AGT , let
Ctrl i =
p ∈ P : ∀v ∈W,
M, v |= [{i} : stit]p or
M, v |= [{i} : stit]¬p

be the set of atoms in P controlled by agent i. For any J ⊆ AGT , let CtrlJ =
⋃
i∈J Ctrli.
Lemma 3. For all J ⊆ AGT , X ⊆ P, piX ⊆ X and w ∈W we have:
(i) if CtrlJ = X then CtrlAGT\J = P \X,
(ii) if M, w |=STIT
∧
p∈pi+X p ∧
∧
p∈pi−X ¬p and CtrlJ = X then, for all v ∈ RJ(w), we haveM, v |=STIT
∧
p∈pi+X p ∧
∧
p∈pi−X ¬p,
(iii) if CtrlJ = X then, for all pi
′
P\X ⊆ P\X, there exists v ∈ RJ(w) such thatM, v |=STIT∧
p∈pi′+
P\X
p ∧∧p∈pi′−
P\X
¬p.
where for any X ⊆ P and for any piX ⊆ X, pi+X = piX and pi−X = X \ piX .
Proof. (i) Let us suppose that p 6∈ CtrlJ . We are going to prove that p ∈ CtrlAGT\J .
From p 6∈ CtrlJ it follows that for all w ∈ W we have M, v |=STIT ¬p for some v ∈ RJ(w).
This implies that for all i ∈ J and for all w ∈ W we have M, w |=STIT ¬[{i} : stit]p ∧
¬[{i} : stit]¬p. From M, w0 |=STIT COMPL it follows that there is i ∈ AGT \ J such
that M, w |=STIT [{i} : stit]p ∨ [{i} : stit]¬p for all w ∈ W . The latter implies that
p ∈ CtrlAGT\J . The other direction (i.e., p ∈ CtrlJ implies p 6∈ CtrlAGT\J) follows from
M, w0 |=STIT EXC + ∧ EXC−.
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(ii) Let us suppose that M, w |= ∧p∈pi+X p ∧ ∧p∈pi−X ¬p and CtrlJ = X. By the fact
that relations RJ are reflexive, it follows that, for all p ∈ pi+X , there exists i ∈ J such that
M, w |=STIT [{i} : stit]p and for all p ∈ pi−X there exists i ∈ J such that M, v |=STIT [{i} :
stit]¬p. From the latter it follows that for all p ∈ pi+X we have M, w |=STIT [J : stit]p and
for all p ∈ pi−X we have M, v |=STIT [J : stit]¬p. Therefore, for all v ∈ RJ(w), we have
M, v |=STIT
∧
p∈pi+X p ∧
∧
p∈pi−X ¬p.
(iii) Let us suppose that CtrlJ = X and let us consider an arbitrary pi
′
P\X ⊆ P \ X
and w ∈ W . From M, w0 |=STIT GRID∗ it follows that there exists v ∈ W such that
M, v |=STIT
∧
p∈pi′+
P\X
p ∧ ∧p∈pi′−
P\X
¬p. By item (ii), the latter implies that there exists
v ∈W such thatM, v |=STIT [AGT \J : stit](
∧
p∈pi′+
P\X
p∧∧p∈pi′−
P\X
¬p). From the constraint
of independence of agents it follows that there exists v ∈ RJ(w) such that M, v |=STIT∧
p∈pi′+
P\X
p ∧∧p∈pi′−
P\X
¬p.
We transform the STIT modelM in a CL−PC modelM∗ = (P1, . . . ,Pn, X∗) as follows:
• for all p ∈ P, p ∈ X∗ if and only if w0 ∈ V (p),
• for all p ∈ P and for all i ∈ AGT , p ∈ Pi if and only if p ∈ Ctrli.
By the item (i) of Lemma 3 it is easy to check that M∗ is indeed a CL−PC model. In
particular, P1, . . . ,Pn is a partition of P among the agents in AGT .
By induction on the structure of ϕ and by using Lemma 3 it is straightforward to prove
that M∗ |=CP ϕ. The only interesting case is ϕ = ♦Jψ:
M, w0 |=STIT〈AGT \ J : stit〉tr3(ψ)
iff M, v |=STIT tr3(ψ) for some v ∈ RAGT\J(w0)
iff there exists XJ ⊆ PJ s.t.
(P1, . . . ,Pn, XJ ∪X∗AGT\J) |=CP ψ
(by I.H., and items (ii) and (iii)
of Lemma 3)
iff M∗ |=CP ♦Jψ
This completes the proof.
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